This article is part of Desire Utilitarianism

Desire Utilitarianism is a newly proposed ethical theory with meta-ethical, normative and applied ethics components. It uses a concepts from action theory, namely Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) Theory and value theory specifically where value is the relation between desires and states of affairs. It derives moral value as being a relation where desires themselves are the object of a desire. In the book A Better Place: Essays on Desire Utilitarianism, originator Alonzo Fyfe defines Desire Utilitarianism as "the idea that morality involves using praise and condemnation to promote desires that tend to fulfill other desires, and to inhibit desires that tend to thwart other desires."^[1]

Contents 1 History 2 Meta-Ethics 3 Normative Ethics 4 Applied Ethics 5 See also 6 External Links 7 References

HistoryEdit

The first explicit expression of desire utilitarian principles can be found in the writings of 17th-century philosopher David Hume. Hume summarized his moral theory by writing, "IT may justly appear surprising that any man in so late an age, should find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning, that Personal Merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others."

Meta-EthicsEdit

Definition of Good

Generic Good

Desire utilitarianism holds that an object, event, or state of affairs is 'good' to the degree that 'reasons for action exist for bringing about that object, event, or state of affairs'. Similarly, an object, event, or state of affairs is 'bad' to the degree that 'reasons for action exist for avoiding or ending that object, event, or state.'

Furthermore, desires are the only reasons for action that exist. Therefore, all value relates objects of evaluation to desires.

Desires and beliefs are both propositional attitudes.

As Fyfe defines them: "A belief is the attitude that a certain proposition (e.g. "God exists') is true. A desire is an attitude that a certain proposition (e.g. "I am having sex with Sam") is to be made or kept true." ^[2].

A beliefs can be either true or false. A desires can be either thwarted or fulfilled.

A 'desire that P' (for some proposition P) is fulfilled in any state of affairs in which P is true. Thus, a desire that 'my child is alive' is fulfilled in any state of affairs in which the proposition 'my child is alive' is true.

A 'desire that P' (for some proposition P) is thwarted in any state of affairs in which P is false. Thus, a desire that 'my child is alive' is thwarted in any state of affairs in which the proposition 'my child is alive' is false.

Note that the agent does not need to know that a desire is fulfilled for a desire to be fulfilled. A desire that 'my child is alive' is fulfilled in any state in which the child is alive - even if the agent is unaware of it. Because of this, a sufficiently strong desire that 'my child is alive' can motivate a parent to risk his life to save his child, even if he does not live to see that his child has been saved. He has acted to create a state in which 'my child is alive' is true.

Desire utilitarianism holds that statements about whether reasons for action exist for realizing or avoiding a particular state of affairs are objectively true or false.

People act according to the more and stronger of their desires.

Moral Good

Moral good is a species of generic good. Moral good is like generic good in that it relates objects of evaluation to the fulfillment of desires. Moral good is more specific than generic good because moral good focuses on desires themselves, and asks whether malleable desires tend to fulfill or thwart the desires of others.

"A good desire is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires. A bad desire is a desire that tends to thwart other desires."^[2]

A desire that tends to fulfill other desires is a virtue.

A desire that tends to thwart other desires is a vice.

Philosophical Considerations

Desire Utilitarianism holds that value is a relation between a desire and a state of affairs and a moral value is a relation where desires themselves are the object of a desire.

It rejects G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy as itself being a version of the masked man fallacy^[3].

It claims to bridge Hume's is-ought gap by asserting that desires are brain states and that as long as one of the 'is' premises refers to a desire then one can derive an 'ought' as the conclusion ^[4] .

It uses similar arguments against intrinsic prescriptivity or classical objective value to those of Error Theory and argues that relational value is a type of objective fact to resolve the fact-value distinction. This becomes a modified version of moral realism but where it is relational not intrinsic value that is objective.

As such Desire Utilitarianism can be considered is a version of ethical naturalism. So it argues against moral non-cognitivism that moral reasoning is meaningful by using suitably grammatically modified substitutions of 'good' with 'is such as to fulfill the desires in question', an 'moral good' (or 'virtue') with 'malleable desires that (tend to) fulfill other desires' and 'evil' or 'vice' with 'malleable desires that (tend to) thwart other desires'.

Furthermore, it argues against individualist subjectivism that it is all desires, not just those of the agent, that must be taken into consideration.

With respect to moral relativism it says that societies can be morally evaluated according to the degree that they fulfill or thwart desires of all its constituents.

Since it holds that a desire is an attitude that a proposition is made or kept true, it rejects any desire that is dependent upon a fiction and any moral theories based on such fictions such as Divine Command Theory - since doing God's will is a desire that can never be fulfilled. It argues against Ideal Observer Theory that ideal observer theory relies on false metaphysics, whereas as Desire Utilitarianism avoids such unnecessary assumptions.^[5]

Normative EthicsEdit

Desire Utilitarianism as a Utilitarian Theory

Desire utilitarianism is a form of utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism holds that morality is concerned with maximizing 'the good' and that the good can be expressed in forms of utility.

There are different forms of utilitarian theory based on:

(1) What counts as 'the good'? Different utilitarians have advanced a number of different theories of 'the good'. These include the idea that 'the good' is pleasure and the absence of pain (Jeremy Bentham), happiness (John Stuart Mill), or preference satisfaction (Peter Singer).

(2) What is the primary object of moral evaluation? The major distinction here is between act utilitarianism (the right act is the act that maximizes the good), and rule utilitarianism (the right act is the act that corresponds to the best rules, and the best rules are those that maximize utility).

Desire utilitarianism holds that 'the good' is found in the fulfillment of desires. The stronger and more common the desires, the greater the good. This is a generic account of good. Moral good is a species of generic goodness, one that focuses on good desires. A good desire, then, is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires. A bad desire tends to thwart other desires.

Desire utilitarianism also holds that the ultimate object of moral evaluations are maleable desires - desires that can be molded by social forces. The right act is not the act that fulfills the most desires. The right act is the act that a person with good desires would perform, where good desires tend to fulfill other desires.

If we imagine a case in which torturing a child will fulfill the desires of a large number of sadists, desire utilitarianism will not call this a good act. Rather, desire utilitarianism first looks at the fact that the desire to torture children is a bad desire, and as such there is adequate reason to use social forces to make this desire as rare and as weak as possible.

Desire utilitarianism is the idea that people generally have real reasons to promote good desires and to discourage bad desires. Specifically, it recommends focusing on changing malleable desires, since it is only desires not beliefs (according to BDI Theory) that are end-reasons for action and only malleable desires can be altered.

In order to decide what to promote and condemn, desire utilitarianism evaluates malleable desires. It can also evaluate actions, rules, rights, duties, consequences and laws where the moral value of any of these is derived from a prior evaluation of desires. For example the right act is the act that a person with good desires would perform. In these cases, a determination of good desires is logically prior to a determination of right action.

The means for promoting and discouraging desires are primarily praise and condemnation to enable the voluntary change of such desires. It also uses suitably formulated institutions to provide reward and punishment, operating as additional and secondary incentives, to those who would otherwise persist with acting out bad desires and who do not or cannot respond to praise and condemnation.

Applied Ethics Edit

Desire Utilitarianism is a morally progressive theory that combines with the latest empirical data to attempt to tentatively resolve both classical moral issues such as abortion ^{[6] [7]}, euthanasia ^[8], pornography ^{[9] [10]}, homosexuality ^[11] and capital punishment ^[12] and more commonplace issues such as sophistry, negligence, incompetence and recklessness. It regards this provisional approach as one of its strengths and as a point of criticism of other theories. In application it is used first as means to identify and eliminate fallacious, imperfect and incomplete beliefs that can distort the evaluation process and then to identify what relevant empirical data is required, and if it exists, and then evaluates this according to the fulfilment and thwarting of the desires in question.

See alsoEdit

• Utilitarianism
• BDI (philosophy)

External LinksEdit

• Towards a Naturalistic Formation of Ethics: Bridging the "Is-Ought" Gap
• Overview of Desire Utilitarianism (Richard Chappell)
• Atheists and Morality? on Pharyngula
• The Triad of Reason Infidel Guy Podcast
• eSkeptic Michael Shermer on Alonzo Fyfe's blog

ReferencesEdit

1. ↑
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2. ↑ ^{2.0 2.1} What Is Desire Utilitarianism?. Alonzo Fyfe (2007-03-07). Retrieved on 2007-05-23.
3. ↑ The Naturalistic Fallacy. Alonzo Fyfe (2006-04-02). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.
4. ↑ Christmas Chat. Alonzo Fyfe (2005-12-25). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.
5. ↑ Evaluating Moral Theories. Alonzo Fyfe (2007-04-24). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.
6. ↑ Abortion (and Infanticide): Part I. Alonzo Fyfe (2005-11-04). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.
7. ↑ Abortion (and Infanticide): Part II. Alonzo Fyfe (2005-11-05). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.
8. ↑ Physician Assisted Suicide. Alonzo Fyfe (2005-10-08). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.
9. ↑ Pornography 1. Alonzo Fyfe (2007-05-16). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.
10. ↑ Pornography 2. Alonzo Fyfe (2007-05-17). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.
11. ↑ Homosexuality. Alonzo Fyfe (2005-11-20). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.
12. ↑ Capital Punishment. Alonzo Fyfe (2005-11-21). Retrieved on 2007-05-28.